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A Tax-Based Approach to Slowing Global Climate Change 
Joseph E. Aldy, Eduardo Ley, and Ian W.H. Parry 
Abstract 
In this paper, we discuss the design of carbon dioxide (CO2) taxes at the domestic and 
international level and the choice of taxes versus a cap-and-trade system. A strong case can be made for 
taxes on uncertainty, fiscal, and distributional grounds, though this critically hinges on policy specifics 
and how revenues are used. The efficient near-term tax is at least $5–$20 per ton of CO2 and the tax 
should be imposed upstream with incentives for downstream sequestration and abatement of other 
greenhouse gases. At the international level, a key challenge is the possibility that emissions taxes might 
be undermined through offsetting changes in other energy policies.  
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A Tax-Based Approach to Slowing Global Climate Change 
Joseph E. Aldy, Eduardo Ley, and Ian W.H. Parry∗ 
“The U.S. must engage in an energy efficiency program that takes effect without delay and has 
meaningful bite. As long as developing countries can point to the U.S. as a free rider there will not be 
serious dialogue about what they are willing to do. I prefer carbon and/or gasoline tax measures to 
permit systems or heavy regulatory approaches because the latter are more likely to be economically 
inefficient and to be regressive.”  
 
—Lawrence Summers, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, currently Professor at Harvard University 
(from Practical Steps to Climate Control, The Financial Times May 28, 2007). 
  
“Frankly, a Kyoto-type framework—one with global quantitative emissions targets allocated among 
countries … is not feasible. The only approach that will fulfill the conditions and relieve countries’ 
apprehensions regarding sovereignty and free riding is one in which all countries agree to penalize 
their carbon emissions in such a way that, over time, an internationally harmonized carbon price 
prevails. Consequently, the negotiation’s focus would not be on emissions quotas but on the harmonized 
carbon-price trajectory. 
 
Of course, carbon taxes (on burning fossil fuels) would provide the easiest way for countries to 
comply with the system, and each country could then decide what to do with the tax revenue. Some 
might make their carbon tax revenue-neutral by reducing other taxes. The regime would allow 
countries (or associations of countries such as the EU) to comply with the internationally agreed-upon 
carbon price by means of their own national cap-and-trade systems. It would also let poor countries 
move toward the agreed trajectory of carbon prices more slowly than rich countries. 
 
If you’re worried about climate change but don’t like carbon taxes, think about the messy or even 
impossible alternatives!” 
 
—Ernesto Zedillo, former president of Mexico, currently Director of the Center for the Study of 
Globalization at Yale University (from Carbon Prices, Not Quotas, Forbes March 24, 2008). 
I. Introduction 
There is widespread agreement on the desirability of a globally based effort to mitigate 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly the primary gas, carbon dioxide (CO2), with 
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the ultimate objective of stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations.1 Of course, considerable 
dispute continues regarding how rapidly to scale back global CO2 emissions. For practical policy 
purposes, however, the immediate issue is how to develop an international climate policy regime 
with a robust emissions mitigation effort as its centerpiece, one that can progressively 
incorporate rapidly industrializing nations, and that can adjust over time as more is learned about 
the science, economics, and technological change that characterizes the climate change problem.  
For mitigating GHG emissions, economists favor emissions taxes and cap-and-trade 
systems. Most of the policy discussion has focused on cap-and-trade systems, with the 
introduction of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), and the emphasis on 
trading in most climate bills currently pending in the U.S. Congress. However, as the quotes by 
Secretary Summers and President Zedillo suggest, and as we argue below, a potentially strong 
case can be made for carbon taxes. The policy landscape is not void of carbon taxes, as evident 
by the use of such taxes in northern Europe since the early 1990s, the recently implemented 
carbon tax in the province of British Columbia, and a couple of bills in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. And even if additional governments do not implement CO2 taxes in the near 
term, it is important to assess the possible case for transitioning to a tax-based system over the 
longer haul. Thus, it is critical to understand how to design a CO2 tax at domestic and 
international levels and to compare its advantages and disadvantages with those of a cap-and-
trade approach. Because cap and trade is often heralded as a market-based approach in the 
political discourse, it is worth noting at the outset that both systems are equally market-based in 
the sense that their effectiveness relies in affecting market behavior through emissions pricing. 
We begin this paper by comparing CO2 taxes and emissions trading from a domestic 
perspective across a broad range of criteria of potential concern to policymakers.2 Next, we 
                                                 
1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) concludes that warming of the Earth’s climate system is 
unequivocal and that a delay in reducing GHGs significantly constrains opportunities to achieve lower climate 
stabilization targets. A U.S. National Academy of Sciences (2008) report states that “There is a growing concern 
about global warming and the impact it will have on people and the ecosystems on which they depend. […] 
Temperatures will likely rise at least another 2°F (1.1°C), and possibly more than 11°F (6.1°C), over the next 100 
years. This warming will cause significant changes in sea level, ecosystems, and ice cover, among other impacts.” 
2 We focus on CO2 taxes for ease of exposition. As we discuss below, climate change policy should also target 
various other non-CO2 GHGs. Most of the discussion here is from the perspective of a prototypical developed 
country; we touch only briefly on issues related to implementation and monitoring that may be relevant for less 
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briefly discuss some further issues in the practical design of a domestic CO2 tax as well as issues 
in implementing CO2 taxes at the global level. We then offer some concluding remarks.  
II. Issues in the Choice of Control Instrument⎯A Domestic Perspective 
In choosing among alternative instruments, a wide array of criteria may be of concern to 
policymakers. These include cost-effectiveness, the ability to deal with uncertainty over 
emissions abatement costs, and the incidence of the emissions mitigation policy, particularly the 
distribution of costs borne by different household income groups and by industries. We discuss 
the appropriate stringency of domestic climate policy later.  
Even evaluating policies on a single criterion alone can be tricky. For example, the 
overall cost and distributional impacts of CO2 taxes depend critically on what the government 
does with the revenues collected from those taxes. Further, satisfying one criterion may limit the 
government’s ability to address another criterion. For instance, using some CO2 tax revenues to 
provide compensation to politically influential groups may raise the overall costs of the policy by 
reducing revenues that might otherwise have been available for cutting other taxes that distort 
economic activity. Finally, comparing CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade systems in their pure forms 
does not do justice to the full spectrum of policy options. Policymakers may modify either 
instrument’s design, at least to some extent, to exploit apparent advantages of the other 
instrument. 
In this section, we consider each of the major criteria in turn and discuss to what extent, if 
any, they imply a strong case for preferring CO2 taxes to other emissions mitigation instruments, 
primarily cap-and-trade systems.3  
A. Cost-Effectiveness 
We start with cost-effectiveness, using the more traditional and narrow definition of cost 
that encompasses only changes in economic efficiency in the markets directly affected by the 
emissions mitigation policy. This notion of cost essentially reflects the loss of benefits to fossil 
fuel users, less savings in production costs from reduced fossil fuel supply. Under this narrow 
definition, emissions taxes and cap-and-trade systems can essentially be viewed as equivalent 
                                                 
3 Goulder and Parry (2008), Aldy et al. (2008), and Hepburn (2006) also provide broad discussions of the literature 
on alternative emissions control instruments. Our discussion in this section draws most heavily from Goulder and 
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instruments. This equivalency breaks down, however, when we account for abatement-cost 
uncertainty (section II.B), and for how policies interact with the broader fiscal system (section 
II.C).  
In the context of the narrow definition, cost minimization requires equating marginal 
abatement costs across all emissions sources. These options include: 
 
•  Switching to fuels with lower, or zero, carbon content. In the power sector, for example, 
this would involve replacing coal-fired generation with generation from natural gas, 
nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar power.  
•  Adoption of energy-conserving technologies to lower fuel requirements per unit of 
economic activity. In the transportation sector, for example, this would include the 
incorporation of technologies to improve vehicle fuel economy. In the residential sector, 
it would include upgrading the efficiency of lighting, heating, and cooling systems as 
well as the adoption of more energy-efficient appliances.  
•  Reducing overall demand for energy-intensive activities by, for example, traveling less or 
dwelling in smaller homes.  
•  Sequestering carbon to partly offset emissions through carbon capture and storage 
technologies at coal plants or other industrial facilities and through the expansion of 
forested land or modification of agricultural techniques to sequester carbon in soil. 
 
In principle, when all firms and households face a common price per unit of CO2 
embodied in fuels and energy-intensive products, then no additional policies can lower the total 
cost of attaining a specified policy goal. These cost-minimizing conditions could be largely 
achieved under a CO2 tax applied upstream in the fossil fuel supply chain, with corresponding 
tax credits for downstream sequestration, like carbon capture and storage at coal plants. This tax, 
which would be levied in proportion to a fuel’s carbon content, would be largely passed forward 
into the price of coal, natural gas, and petroleum products, and therefore ultimately embodied in 
the price of electricity and other energy-intensive products. This carbon added tax system, along 
the carbon chain, would work much in the same way as a typical value added tax under the 
standard credit–invoice system, along the value chain.4 
                                                 
4 The carbon taxes dating to the early 1990s in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden do not achieve cost-
effective emissions mitigation because they allow for significant variation in the tax per unit of carbon by fuels and 
by sectors (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004; Vehmas 2005). In contrast, the British Columbia CO2 tax imposes a uniform 
rate on carbon across different fossil fuels (Government of British Columbia 2008).  Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
5 
The same efficiency conditions could also be met under an upstream cap-and-trade 
system, under which firms require allowances to cover the carbon content of fuels they mine or 
process and the market price of allowances is established in permit trading markets. This price is 
then passed forward into fuel prices. With competitive markets, and appropriate crediting 
provisions for downstream sequestration, there is very little difference between emissions taxes 
and cap-and-trade systems in terms of the emissions mitigation that they encourage.5 
Direct regulatory instruments, such as mandates to install specific emissions control or 
energy-saving technologies, or requirements for the performance of firm production, fail to meet 
the cost-minimizing criterion. Compared with a CO2 tax or cap-and-trade system, and for the 
same economy-wide emissions goal, some abatement opportunities are overburdened under 
direct regulation, whereas others are underexploited or not exploited at all.6  
B. Implications of Abatement Cost Uncertainty 
Uncertainty over the future costs of emissions abatement is inevitable as costs will vary 
with fuel prices, the strength of domestic energy demand, unpredictable advances in energy-
saving technologies, and so forth. Abatement costs, however, will also depend on the choice of 
emissions control instrument. CO2 taxes fix the price of emissions, and therefore the marginal 
costs of abatement, while allowing the quantity of emissions to vary with economic conditions. 
                                                 
5 In practice, achieving cost-effectiveness may be more difficult under a cap-and-trade system in the early years 
because of additional informational requirements. Under a tax, the future emissions price is known, whereas under 
cap and trade, firms must project future allowance prices. To the extent that price expectations among firms differ, 
this may lead to a disparity in marginal abatement costs across emissions-reducing capital investments. Whether this 
significantly compromises the cost-effectiveness of emissions trading schemes has not been explored in the 
literature. 
6 Consider, for example, standards for the average fuel economy of vehicles in a manufacturer’s sales fleet. By 
itself, of course, this policy fails to exploit any emissions mitigation opportunities outside of the automobile sector. 
This substantially reduces the cost-effectiveness of the policy (relative to an economy-wide CO2 tax) given that, in 
the United States for example, automobiles only account for one-fifth of nationwide CO2 emissions (Energy 
Information Administration 2008). Nor does the policy encourage any downstream sequestration activities. Even 
within the automobile sector, the policy does not exploit emissions mitigation through reduced vehicle miles of 
travel because, unlike a gasoline tax, or a tax on the carbon content of gasoline, fuel economy regulations do not 
increase fuel costs per mile driven. Furthermore, unless fuel economy credits are tradable across firms, no automatic 
mechanism equates the marginal costs of improving fuel economy across different auto manufacturers. Austin and 
Dinan (2005) find that the long-run costs of reducing gasoline or, equivalently, CO2 emissions, from automobiles, 
by around 10 percent, would be about 70 percent greater under tighter fuel economy regulations than under higher 
gasoline taxes.  Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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In contrast, a pure cap-and-trade system fixes the quantity of emissions, leaving marginal 
abatement costs to fluctuate with economic conditions. 
From the perspective of maximizing expected economic welfare, CO2 taxes have an 
advantage over cap-and-trade systems. CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade systems both affect the flow 
of emissions, although it is the atmospheric stock of gases that drive climate change damages. 
The stock changes slowly, because of the long atmospheric residence of CO2 (on average about a 
hundred years). For example, the Mauna Loa record dating to 1959 shows that atmospheric CO2 
concentrations grow about 1 to 2 parts per million (ppm) annually, on a preindustrial base of 
about 270 ppm. Because global emissions in any given year have a proportionately small impact 
on the stock of CO2, the marginal benefits of abatement are essentially perfectly elastic.  
Figure 1 illustrates the potential welfare effects of ex ante efficient policies in this setting 
(based on Weitzman 1974). MC
E is the expected marginal cost schedule for emissions 
abatement, and MB is the marginal benefit from abatement. If marginal costs turn out to be 
higher than anticipated, MCH, then the efficient amount of abatement is QH, whereas if costs are 
lower than expected, MCL, the optimal abatement is QL. A Pigouvian emissions tax of T*, equal 
to marginal benefits, automatically generates these efficient abatement levels, regardless of the 
position of the marginal cost curve. In contrast, under a fixed emissions cap of Q
E, abatement 
will be excessive if marginal costs are higher then expected, or too low if marginal costs are 
lower than expected, resulting in deadweight losses (DWL), relative to the emissions tax, shown 
by the shaded triangles in Figure 1. In fact, the welfare differences between carbon emissions 
taxes and cap-and-trade systems can be striking. For example, simulations in Pizer (2002) and 
Newell and Pizer (2003) suggest that a CO2 tax could result in welfare gains up to five times 
those of the expectation-equivalent cap-and-trade system.7  
                                                 
7 Uncertainty over the marginal benefits from abatement does not affect these results as long as this is independent 
of the uncertainty over marginal abatement costs (Stavins 1996). This is a reasonable approximation for the near 
term. Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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Alternatively, if the policymaker aims to minimize the present discounted value of costs 
for limiting emissions released into the atmosphere over a long period of time, then emissions 
taxes again have an advantage over cap-and-trade. An emissions tax rising at the rate of interest 
over time (net of the “depreciation rate” of atmospheric accumulations of emissions) will equate 
the present value of marginal abatement costs across different periods. In contrast, under a pure 
allowance system, abatement will be excessive (and allowance prices too high) in periods when 
meeting the fixed cap is more costly than average, whereas abatement will be too low in periods 
when the marginal costs of meeting the cap are lower than average.  
However, modifying a cap-and-trade system to incorporate some of the price-stabilizing 
characteristics of an emissions tax can mitigate some of the welfare differences between the pure 
forms of these two instruments. For example, a hybrid tax-allowance approach, often referred to 
as a safety valve, could reduce price volatility (Kopp et al. 1997; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1997; 
Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). Under such an approach, the government would agree to sell an 
unlimited number of additional allowances at a predetermined price into a cap-and-trade market. 
If emissions trading results in allowance prices below this predetermined price, then the market Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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behaves as a normal cap-and-trade regime. The safety valve serves as a ceiling on the allowance 
price, such that, if prices increase enough that it becomes economic for firms to purchase safety 
valve allowances instead of buying allowances at even higher prices, then the system effectively 
transforms into a tax: firms purchase safety valve allowances, thereby relaxing the cap on the 
program’s emissions. 
In a related policy context, the safety valve has already become a part of implementing 
renewable energy goals. The Massachusetts renewable portfolio standard for the state’s power 
sector allows utilities to buy and sell renewable energy credits. In lieu of holding sufficient 
credits to satisfy the standard, utilities may also comply with their regulatory obligation by 
making Alternative Compliance Payments, initially set at $50 per megawatt-hour in 2003 and 
adjusted annually for inflation (Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources 2008).   
The basic model of cap and trade allows for firms to equate marginal costs of abatement 
across all sources. Modifying cap and trade to allow intertemporal emissions trading would 
provide the opportunity for firms to equate (discounted) marginal costs over time and facilitate 
efforts to smooth out year-to-year allowance price volatility. Unfettered intertemporal trading 
would allow firms to bank allowances for use later (e.g., when current prices are low and 
expected future prices are high) and to borrow allowances from future periods when future prices 
are expected to be lower than current prices.8 The European ETS now allows full banking of 
emissions allowances; however, firms are not allowed to borrow allowances from future policy 
commitment periods. This could create problems in the near term, before firms have 
accumulated a substantial bank of allowances, as it leaves the system vulnerable to shocks, such 
as a jump in natural gas prices that would raise the costs of fuel switching in the power sector.9  
 
                                                 
8 Borrowing could take two forms. First, the government may allocate multiple years’ worth of permits at the 
beginning of the cap-and-trade system, and firms would have discretion regarding when to use permits of various 
vintages. Second, firms could go to the government and borrow permits that would then translate into smaller future 
allocations. 
9 The banking provisions were introduced after the pilot phase of the ETS witnessed quite volatile allowance prices. 
But even with banking, CO2 prices continue to fluctuate, with the maximum daily allowance price about 33 percent 
higher than the minimum price over the first three-and-a-half months of 2008 (allowance prices are posted at 
www.pointcarbon.com). To the extent that this causes marginal abatement costs to vary substantially within a period 
of just a few months, the cost-effectiveness of the cap-and-trade system is significantly undermined. Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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A further alternative would be to attempt to stabilize the allowance market through a 
“Climate Fed” that could counteract severe price volatility through buying or selling allowances 
to the market in times of unusually high or low prices. Several U.S. domestic climate policy bills 
envision this type of scheme. One could consider a variety of tools at the disposal of the Climate 
Fed, such as relaxing emissions caps, reallocating caps by borrowing emissions from future 
periods to augment current-period allowance allocations, or increasing the amount of offsets that 
would be allowed into the cap-and-trade regime.  
C. Cost-Effectiveness Accounting for Fiscal Interactions  
The overall economic costs of emissions mitigation policies, and the choice among 
different instruments, is further complicated by how these policies interact with distortions 
elsewhere in the economy created by the broader tax system.  
The environmental tax literature emphasizes that emissions taxes potentially impact tax 
distortions in economy-wide factor markets—particularly those in the labor market created by 
income and payroll taxes—in two main ways (e.g., Goulder 1995). First is the “revenue 
recycling effect.” Using CO2 tax revenues to reduce existing factor taxes generates a gain in 
economic efficiency equal to the increase in labor (or capital) supply, multiplied by the wedge 
between the gross factor price and the net-of-tax factor price.10 The potential welfare gains, even 
from very small increases in the supply of capital and labor, could be relatively large because the 
benefits of tax rate reductions apply to the entire economy, whereas the costs of abatement 
accrue primarily to the energy sector (e.g., Parry et al. 1999).  
Second, however, an offsetting effect would occur. As firms pass CO2 taxes forward into 
higher energy prices, this drives up product prices in general, thereby depressing the real return-
to-work effort and savings—in other words, the amount of goods that people can buy with their 
take-home wages or income from savings. Reducing the buying power (real returns to) capital 
and labor would depress labor supply and capital accumulation. This so-called “tax-interaction 
effect” would compound the current tax distortions in factor markets and increase the costs of the 
climate policy.  
                                                 
10 The gross factor price reflects the marginal value of production to firms from the last unit of the factor, whereas 
the net factor price reflects the marginal cost of factor supply to households (e.g., the marginal cost of foregone 
nonmarket time). This applies at least when factor markets are competitive. Factor market impacts are more opaque 
in the presence of institutional wage setting, which is important in certain European labor markets (Bosello et al. 
2001). Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
10 
A large literature on these two effects has evolved over the past 15 years, and most 
analyses find that the costly tax-interaction exceeds the beneficial revenue-recycling effect, 
implying that the overall costs of carbon taxes are somewhat larger than the costs of carbon 
reductions in fossil fuel and energy markets (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 2002). However, the 
magnitude of the revenue-recycling effect is highly sensitive to the details of the tax shift. For 
example, if the CO2 tax revenue is predominantly used to reduce taxes on capital income, the 
revenue-recycling effect is larger (as capital taxes are thought to involve higher distortionary 
costs at the margin than labor taxes) and could exceed the tax-interaction effect (Bovenberg and 
Goulder 1997). Alternatively, if CO2 tax revenue is used to cut marginal personal income tax 
rates, this can also raise the revenue-recycling effect above the tax-interaction effect by (slightly) 
reducing distortions between ordinary spending and tax-favored spending on home ownership, 
employer medical insurance, and so forth (Parry and Bento 2000). On the other hand, using 
revenue to raise personal income tax thresholds or to introduce similar threshold exemptions for 
payroll taxes would produce a smaller revenue-recycling benefit because it would encourage 
more labor force participation but not additional effort on the job or longer work hours.   
In contrast to a revenue-neutral CO2 tax, a cap-and-trade program with gratis allocation 
incurs much higher total costs. The government foregoes collecting revenues when it transfers 
free allowances to firms, but the allowance price yields the same tax-interaction effect—by 
increasing energy costs—as if an emissions tax were imposed at the same price. The cost 
advantage of (revenue-neutral) emissions taxes can be substantial. For example, a $10-per-ton 
CO2 tax ($37 per ton of carbon) could lower U.S. emissions by 5–10 percent and raise annual 
revenues of approximately $60 billion in the near term. If the government used this revenue to 
reduce income taxes, based on typical assumptions in the literature, the CO2 tax would deliver 
roughly $20 billion per year in cost savings over an equivalent cap-and-trade system that did not 
exploit a similar revenue-recycling effect.11   
                                                 
11 Two caveats to this argument must be considered. First, even cap-and-trade systems with entirely free allowance 
allocation can raise a limited amount of revenue for the government indirectly (perhaps around 40 percent of that 
raised directly under the equivalent emissions tax). This occurs as firms receiving allowances with market value for 
free experience an increase in their equity values, which, in turn, leads to higher corporate taxes and ultimately 
higher income and capital gains taxes for individual shareholders. Second, the tax-interaction effect may be 
somewhat weaker under freely allocated permits than under emissions taxes in countries that retain some price 
regulation in the power sector (such as the United States). Electric utilities subject to such regulation cannot pass 
through the market value of freely received permits into higher generation prices (Burtraw et al. 2002); this, in turn, 
weakens the policy’s impact on the overall price level, and hence limits the reduction in real factor returns and the 
tax-interaction effect. Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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Of course in practice, CO2 revenues might be squandered in special interest spending, 
rather than used to cut other distortionary taxes (or finance other socially desirable public 
spending), thereby reducing, and possibly even reversing, the sign of the revenue-recycling 
benefit. Conversely, a cap-and-trade program could exploit the revenue-recycling effect if 
allowances were auctioned off by the government. Again, therefore, whether a strong case can be 
made for emissions taxes over cap and trade depends critically on the details of the 
accompanying legislation. 
The plan for the European ETS is to transition to a fully auctioned allowance system by 
2020 (CEC 2008), incorporating into the system one of the key attractions of the emissions tax 
alternative. It is not yet clear, however, how all this new revenue will be used, as the plan does 
not specify revenue neutrality. In contrast, Sweden began using carbon tax revenue in 2000 to 
offset labor taxes (Government of Sweden 2005). British Columbia implemented a CO2 tax of 
$10 per ton in July 2008, with a ramp-up of $5 per ton CO2 per year until reaching $30 per ton in 
2012. The BC carbon tax program stipulates revenue neutrality, and the only permissible form of 
revenue recycling is the reduction of taxes borne by individuals and businesses (Government of 
British Columbia 2008).12 
D. Distributional Considerations 
For reasons of fairness and practical feasibility, policymakers have expressed concern 
over the distributional burdens of domestic mitigation policies on different household income 
groups and on energy-intensive industries. Although pure emissions taxes and cap-and-trade 
systems have very different distributional implications, again the government can modify either 
instrument to mimic, at least in part, any distributional advantage of the other instrument. 
Distributional Impacts across Household Income Groups 
Low-income households are more vulnerable to increases in the price of energy-intensive 
goods, such as electricity, home heating fuels, and gasoline, because they spend a larger share of 
their budget on these items compared with wealthier households. The regressivity of CO2 
taxes—reflected by the greater burden-to-income ratio for lower-income groups than for higher-
income groups—varies by the time frame of measurement. Generally, analysts prefer using a 
                                                 
12 The revenues from Norway’s CO2 tax go to general revenues, so it is not clear whether this ultimately results in 
greater public spending or reduced rates for other taxes (Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004). Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
12 
measure of lifetime income in incidence analysis, as this better reflects households’ long-run 
consumption possibilities, though measuring lifetime income presents difficult technical and data 
challenges. Studies that use a measure of lifetime, as opposed to annual, income find that CO2 
taxes are less regressive than static analyses suggest (see Parry et al. 2006 for a review).     
Traditional cap-and-trade systems with free allowance allocation provide no mechanism 
for addressing concerns about the disproportionate burden of higher energy prices on lower-
income households. In fact, they make the problem worse by widening the disparity in burden-
to-income ratios among lower- and higher-income households. The distribution of free 
allowances with market value raises firm profits and equity values; this ultimately benefits 
shareholders, who tend to be concentrated in upper-income groups. In fact, Dinan and Rogers 
(2002) find that a cap-and-trade system with free allocation mitigating CO2 emissions by 15 
percent overcompensates the wealthiest households, as their additional capital income 
substantially exceeds the burden on them from higher energy prices. 
In contrast, under a CO2 tax or auctioned allowance system, policymakers can address 
fairness concerns, at least in part, by recycling some of the revenue in ways that 
disproportionately benefit low-income households, such as reductions in payroll taxes, or 
increases in income tax thresholds. For example, Metcalf (2007) outlines a scheme for a $15 per 
ton tax on CO2 emissions ($55 per ton of carbon) in the United States, with revenues funding 
payroll tax rebates in a manner that imposes the same approximate burden-to-income ratio across 
income deciles. Some elderly or other nonworking households, however, do not benefit from 
payroll tax reductions and may require compensation through other means, such as targeted 
energy assistance programs. Recycling CO2 tax revenues in ways that disproportionately help 
lower-income households may involve some sacrifice of economic efficiency compared with 
across-the-board reductions in distortionary taxes, although the potential empirical magnitude of 
these losses has not received attention in the literature.   
Distributional Impacts on Energy-Intensive Firms 
Some have advocated gratis allowance allocations to the business community to 
effectively secure their support for climate change policy (e.g., McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2007). 
Clearly, providing some compensation for politically influential industries most affected by 
federal climate policy for their loss of equity value might be part of the political deal making 
needed to move legislation forward. To the extent that firms’ (short-run) supply curves slope 
upward rather than being perfectly elastic, some of the burden of the emissions mitigation policy Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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may come at the expense of lower producer surplus—through a reduction in producer prices—
rather than passing forward the entire burden in higher consumer prices.  
Under a cap-and-trade system, the government can compensate firms by giving them an 
allowance allocation with a market value equal to their potential reduction in equity value or 
producer surplus. A domestic CO2 cap-and-trade program with free allocation of 15–20 percent 
of total emissions allowances could keep fuel suppliers and power generators whole (Bovenberg 
and Goulder 2001; Smith et al. 2002).13 Providing such compensation has a cost, as it reduces the 
amount of revenue that could potentially finance reductions in other distortionary taxes. For 
example, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) estimate that the overall costs of freely distributing 15–
20 percent of allowances would be about 7 percent greater than a 100 percent auction to finance 
reductions in distortionary taxes. Obviously, the total cost increases much more under a more 
aggressive emissions mitigation program that requires greater compensation.  
The government could pursue a similar approach under a CO2 tax by providing 
inframarginal exemptions. For example, the tax could apply only after a firm’s emissions equal 
to 15–20 percent of historic emissions, allowing for full compensation just as if the firm had 
received 15–20 percent of emissions allowances for free under a cap-and-trade program.14 
In some cases, emissions sources have been exempt outright from CO2 taxes. For 
example, Norway’s CO2 tax, implemented in 1991, covered about only two-thirds of the 
economy’s emissions, and a reform of Sweden’s CO2 tax in 1993 exempted industrial sources 
from paying carbon taxes on electricity and fossil fuels. These exemptions obviously raise the 
overall costs of the CO2 tax, relative to a comprehensive tax, by failing to exploit low-cost 
abatement opportunities in the exempt sector.  
                                                 
13 Compensation would become more difficult (i.e., a greater share of allowances would have to be given away for 
free) as the emissions cap is progressively tightened over time, and beyond some point, even giving away 100 
percent of the allowances would not be sufficient to fully compensate firms. This issue might be addressed through 
excess compensation in the early years of the program (e.g., Stavins 2007). Progressively phasing out compensation 
over time makes sense because it avoids potential difficulties in updating the share of the allowance cap going to 
different firms, as different firms expand or contract at different rates in the future.  
14 Compensation for firms lying downstream of the point of regulation (e.g., power companies) could also be 
provided under either policy through free allowance distribution or temporary relief from other taxes.  Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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E. Summary 
The case for preferring CO2 taxes to cap-and-trade systems depends critically on several 
design choices. If cap-and-trade programs incorporate provisions to contain allowance price 
volatility and to transition to full revenue-neutral allowance auctions, then a CO2 tax may not 
strongly dominate a cap-and-trade regime. If the only politically viable type of cap-and-trade 
system is of the pure form, however, then CO2 taxes are a far better alternative, as long as 
revenues are used judiciously, and large emissions sources are not exempt from the tax.  
III. Designing a Domestic CO2 Tax 
We now discuss further practical issues in the design of a domestic CO2 tax: setting the 
emissions price (tax level); choosing the point of regulation; addressing emissions leakage from 
industrial relocation; incorporating non-CO2 GHGs and downstream sequestration activities; and 
identifying complementary technology policies.15   
A. Tax Level 
Standard economic welfare-maximizing theory recommends that the appropriate CO2 tax 
should reflect the world consequences from the estimated future climate change impacts per ton 
of current CO2 emissions. These consequences encompass damages to agriculture, the impacts of 
(and costs of protecting against) rising sea levels and increased storm intensity, health effects 
(e.g., from the possible spread of tropical disease), ecological disruptions, the risks of major 
disruptions to world output from more extreme climate scenarios, and so forth. Predicting and 
valuing these impacts is extremely difficult and controversial (e.g., Mendelsohn 2005).  
For example, there is substantial uncertainty over the extent and timing of future global 
warming, as well as the accompanying climate changes that might be experienced at a regional 
level. Data available for quantifying the nonmarket impacts of climate change, such as migration 
of ecosystems, is very sparse. The appropriate discount rate for valuing the very long-run 
impacts of today’s emissions is disputed.16 And uncertainty over the pace of future economic 
                                                 
15 Kopp and Pizer (2007) and Stavins (2007) also provide broad discussions of the literature on designing emissions 
control instruments. 
16 Impacts are very long range, not only because emissions have a very long residence time in the atmosphere, but 
also because it takes decades for global temperatures to fully adjust to a change in atmospheric accumulations 
because of gradual heat diffusion processes in the oceans. Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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growth and technological development makes it very difficult to project the vulnerability of the 
world to climate change occurring several decades or more from now. Incorporating the risks of 
catastrophic climate change, such as the potential for a feedback effect or nonlinearity in the 
climate system to result in extreme warming scenarios, is most difficult of all.  
Despite all of these challenges, an evolving valuation literature attempts, albeit very 
roughly, to put a price on CO2 emissions under different future climate scenarios. Most estimates 
put the future damages from today’s emissions at the equivalent of around $5 to $20 per ton of 
CO2 ($20 to $75 per ton of carbon) (Tol 2007). The most comprehensive estimates, developed by 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), and updated in Nordhaus (2008), put the optimal global price at 
$9.5 per ton of CO2 in 2015, rising at about 2 to 2.5 percent per year to $23 per ton by 2050 and 
$56 per ton by 2100 (prices are in 2005 dollars).17 Table 1 illustrates what this level of near-term 
CO2 price would imply for certain energy and fuel prices. 
Table 1. Equivalency of Units  
Tax of $10 per ton of CO2 equals: 
$36.7  Per ton of carbon 
$4.77  Per barrel of oil  
¢8.80  Per gallon of gasoline 
¢2.29  Per liter of gasoline 
¢0.78  Per kilowatt-hour of electricity 
Source: www.epa.gov/solar/energy-resources/calculator.html. 
Note: The CO2 price can also be expressed per million BTU of fuel. For example, a $10 CO2 price amounts to $1.08, 
$1.06, and $1.03 for lignite, sub-bituminous, and bituminous coal, respectively, and ¢87 for residential fuel oil, ¢82 
for crude oil, ¢79 for gasoline, and ¢59 for natural gas, where all units are per million BTU of fuel. 
Some studies, however, suggest substantially higher near-term emissions prices. In 
particular, Stern’s (2007) central estimate of the current marginal damage per ton of CO2 is 
around $85. Stern’s (2007) estimates of the total damages from a given amount of warming 
(expressed as a percentage of world gross domestic product [GDP]) are broadly similar to those 
in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), although the relative contributions of market impacts, nonmarket 
effects, and catastrophic risks is strikingly different in the two studies. As discussed extensively 
                                                 
17 Roughly speaking, the optimal tax rises at the rate of growth in world output potentially affected by future global 
warming. At first glance, one might think that the tax should increase at a faster rate, given that damages are convex 
in the extent of climate change. However, in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), this effect is roughly offset, because 
warming is taken to be a concave function of the atmospheric concentration of GHGs.  Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
16 
in Nordhaus (2007), marginal damages are dramatically larger in Stern (2007) because disutility 
to future (unborn) generations is not discounted in the latter study and this greatly magnifies the 
present value of distant damages, especially when they become very large after 2100.18  
Weitzman (2008) provides an alternative perspective on catastrophic damages.19 He 
shows that, under a plausible utility function, we cannot put an upper bound on marginal 
damages when there is a positive, albeit a very small and very distant, probability of destroying 
the planet as we know it⎯by his definition, this is the possibility of extreme warming reducing 
worldwide consumption by 99 percent indefinitely.20 Analysts who are broadly sympathetic to 
this viewpoint tend to reject attempts to assess Pigouvian emissions taxes and instead focus on 
least-cost emissions pricing trajectories consistent with ultimately stabilizing atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at alternative target levels.  
Although a number of modeling groups have projected such pricing paths, we focus here on a 
study by Clarke et al. (2007) employing three widely respected energy–economic models for the 
U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The models generated carbon price trajectories 
consistent with stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450, 550, and 650 ppm (current 
concentrations are about 385 ppm, compared with preindustrial levels of about 270 ppm). Under 
central projections of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and accounting for 
various non-CO2 greenhouse gases, these stabilization targets would result in mean projected 
long-run warming of about 2.0, 3.0, and 3.6
oC, respectively, above current levels. 
Assuming globally cost-effective emissions mitigation, Clarke et al. (2007) estimate that 
the price on CO2 emissions should rise to $40–$95, $5–$30, or $1–$10 per ton of CO2 by 2025, 
                                                 
18 The appropriate rate at which to discount future global warming damages is extremely contentious—essentially it 
is a philosophical issue that is not going to be resolved any time soon. In our view, economists should objectively 
lay out the case for and against different assumptions and their implications for policy and let the policymakers 
decide how to proceed. Low, or zero, discount rates might be appealing on ethical grounds, given that damages will 
affect people who have not been born yet. But applying these rates in other contexts leads to perverse implications. 
For example, if applied retrospectively, all previous (low-consumption) generations should have been made even 
worse off to make our (high-consumption) generation better off.  
19 In Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Stern (2007), catastrophic damages are quantified based on the subjective 
views of experts concerning the risks of losing, in perpetuity, a large portion (though not an infinitely large portion) 
of world GDP for different levels of warming. 
20 Weitzman (2008) also suggests that cost–benefit analysis is not a useful tool for guiding climate policy when 
uncertainty surrounds both the variance and the mean temperature change (or its effects on economic activity). In 
this “fat-tails” case, the outcome of cost–benefit analysis is highly sensitive to rather arbitrary modeling choices 
about things that we know little about, namely climate damage functions.  Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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respectively, to be consistent with these three stabilization targets, and continue rising at around 
3–5 percent per year thereafter (in real dollars).21 The latter two price ranges are broadly 
consistent, at least in the near term, with those implied by the damage assessment studies that 
employ market discount rates. In striking contrast, the prices for the target of 450 CO2 ppm are 
far more aggressive.  
A critical caveat to these projections is that marginal abatement costs are equated across 
all emissions sources worldwide and across time. For example, to the extent that rapidly 
industrializing nations, such as China, do not fully participate in international emissions control, 
emissions prices in developed countries must be greater to meet the stabilization targets. Indeed, 
one of the modeling teams showed in subsequent work that a 450-ppm goal may not be feasible 
if China does not mitigate its CO2 emissions before 2050 (Edmonds et al. 2007).    
In summary, most analysts fall into one of two broad camps. Some analysts favor 
relatively moderate emissions pricing in the near term, with a progressive ramp-up over time, 
while also preserving the flexibility to ratchet up the price as more information emerges on the 
risk of catastrophes. This position is based on a balancing of damage estimates (discounted at 
market interest rates) and abatement costs. Other analysts favor far more aggressive emissions 
pricing immediately, to put us on a path toward rapid stabilization of atmospheric concentrations. 
This position is based on low discounting of long-range impacts and/or the view that cost–benefit 
analysis cannot handle the possible risks of extraordinarily catastrophic damage. The bottom line 
is that, following the European Union, Japanese and U.S. policymakers need, at the very least, to 
get a moderately scaled emissions pricing program underway. 
 B. Further Design Issues 
Point of Regulation 
Governments should levy a CO2 tax upstream in the fossil fuel supply chain as this 
covers all possible sources of emissions when fuels are later combusted; therefore, it exploits all 
potential opportunities for emissions abatement. The tax should apply to coal produced at the 
                                                 
21 The widely different projections for required emissions prices stem from different assumptions about emissions 
growth in the absence of policy, the development of new technologies such as carbon capture and storage, the scope 
for substituting into nuclear and renewables in power generation, and the uptake of atmospheric CO2 from the 
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mine mouth, petroleum used by refineries and imported petroleum products, and natural gas 
entering the pipeline system.  
In the European Union’s ETS, as well as some cap-and trade systems proposed in U.S. 
climate bills, the regulatory system focuses on downstream users of fossil fuels rather than 
upstream fuel producers. Downstream programs may be attractive to policymakers as they 
represent a natural extension of existing pollution regulations focusing on the power sector and 
major industrial emissions sources. These systems cover only around one-half of economy-wide 
CO2 emissions as they exclude transportation and small-scale emissions sources (Pizer 2007). 
However, their costs, for a given economy-wide emissions reduction, may not be that much 
greater than the alternative upstream program. This is because they still cover the power sector, 
which has a disproportionately large share of low-cost abatement opportunities. Moreover, 
emissions outside of the covered sector can still be regulated through other means, such as higher 
fuel taxes.  
A further advantage of upstream programs is their administrative simplicity. An upstream 
CO2 tax in the United States or Europe would require regulation of only around 2,000−3,000 
entities (Hall 2007). The quantity of fuels produced is readily observed and the carbon content 
varies moderately at most within a fuel type (e.g., across bituminous, lignite, and anthracite 
coal). The costs of monitoring a truly comprehensive downstream program would be daunting as 
there are literally hundreds of millions, if not over a billion, individual GHG emissions sources, 
ranging from vehicles to homes to factories to farms. For this reason, the ETS is limited to 
10,000 or so entities with “big smokestacks” —power plants and factories with large industrial 
boilers (Hall 2007).  
International Emissions Leakage and Competitiveness 
Energy-intensive industries competing in global markets (e.g., steel, cement, and 
aluminum) represent about one-sixth of CO2 emissions for a developed country like the United 
States (Energy Information Administration 2008). Morgenstern et al. (2007) found that 
production costs for these broad industry groups would increase by around 1–2 percent, for each 
$10 increase in the CO2 price, through higher input prices for electricity, fuels, and materials. 
This is probably minor relative to other factors governing the decision of whether to relocate 
plants overseas in countries where carbon is not priced (e.g., the exchange rate risk or the greater 
costs of transporting products back to the domestic market). Consequently, emissions leakage—
that is, the increases in emissions elsewhere as footloose firms relocate abroad—should be of 
relatively modest concern from an efficiency perspective. Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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Nonetheless, domestic firms may still exert political pressure to prevent any “unfair” 
deterioration in their competitive situation compared with foreign suppliers in countries without 
climate policies. One way to address these concerns might be to charge fees on imported goods 
covering the embodied carbon in those products. Conversely, U.S. exporters selling in foreign 
markets might be rebated for domestic taxes paid (by upstream firms) on the embodied carbon of 
those products to prevent their competitiveness from deteriorating. However, measuring 
embodied carbon in finished products, especially those produced in industrializing nations, 
would be contentious and possibly open to abuse by domestic industries seeking protection for 
other reasons. In addition, import taxes and export credits may also run afoul of international 
trade agreements, or may ignite a trade war, thereby jeopardizing recent advances in trade 
liberalization.  
Non-CO2 GHGs 
 Including non-CO2 GHGs into an emissions mitigation program is important. In the 
United States, these gases currently account for about 20 percent of total GHGs, with all gases 
expressed in terms of their lifetime warming potential in CO2 equivalents. At the global level, 
non-CO2 GHGs account for about one-third of total GHGs; although, without mitigation policy, 
they will likely grow more slowly in the future than CO2 emissions (Clarke et al. 2007). Some of 
these gases (e.g., vented methane from underground coal mines and fluorinated gases used in 
refrigerants and air conditioners) could be monitored and incorporated into an emissions tax 
system based on their relative warming potential. 
Methane and nitrous oxides from landfills, manure management, and soil management 
might be incorporated into an emissions tax system through tax credits. Effectively, this provides 
a subsidy for emissions reductions, appropriately set at the same rate as the corresponding 
emissions tax. To qualify for such a subsidy, the onus would fall on the individual entity to 
demonstrate valid emissions reductions relative to what their emissions would have been without 
the subsidy. This takes much of the administrative burden off of the regulator. Other emissions 
sources, which account for about one-third of non-CO2 GHGs in the United States (e.g., methane 
from ruminants), are especially difficult to monitor, and may not be feasible to incorporate into 
an emissions tax system. 
Incentives for Downstream Sequestration 
Extensive research is underway in the public and private sectors to develop technology 
that would capture a large share of CO2 emissions from coal plants and other major stationary 
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geological formations) by retrofitting existing plants or reconfiguring the design of new plants. 
Should this technology be successfully developed, tax credits could provide incentives for its 
adoption. Deutsch and Moniz (2007) suggest that the price of CO2 would need to be at least $25 
per ton to make capture technologies viable for new plants, and even higher for retrofitting of 
existing plants. An argument might be made for initially setting the tax credit per ton of CO2 
sequestered at or above this threshold, even if the near-term price on economy-wide emissions is 
below this level. This would help encourage wider diffusion of the technology as well as learning 
by doing that may lead to spillover benefits to later adopters of the technology. 
Biological sequestration may provide another cost-effective way to mitigate CO2 
emissions, although estimates of the scope for converting cleared land into forests vary in the 
literature (e.g., Stavins and Richards 2005). Conceptually, farms that increased forestland 
coverage would receive a tax credit or subsidy, whereas those that shifted from forests to 
agriculture would pay a tax. According to Sedjo and Toman (2001), a national CO2 tax system 
for the United States could feasibly incorporate forestry, given that transitions between forest and 
agricultural land in the absence of any CO2 policy are relatively small. Remote sensing satellites 
could monitor land use changes and aircraft photography could generate estimates of stand 
species composition. The appropriate CO2 tax or subsidy could then be calculated based on tree 
species and the age of the tree in the growth cycle. 
Complementary Policies To Promote Technological Innovation 
Clearly, the key to meeting the challenge of stabilizing the climate over the long run, at 
an acceptable cost to society, relies on the future development of technologies that will radically 
reduce the emissions intensity of economic activity (Newell 2008). In practice, however, 
designing policies to promote such research and development (R&D) activity, and the diffusion 
of new technologies, is quite difficult. 
First, one must consider whether the government should impose stiffer carbon prices to 
create strong incentives for induced innovation in clean technologies. This issue is not entirely 
resolved in the economics literature. In principle, setting taxes in excess of the marginal damage 
from emissions might be warranted if the losses from excessive near-term abatement were more 
than offset by efficiency benefits from encouraging more clean-technology R&D. This would 
require the returns to society from extra innovation to exceed the private returns enjoyed by the 
firms conducting the R&D. The social returns probably do exceed the private returns, and by a 
potentially large amount, because of the spillover benefits of new knowledge. In fact, the Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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empirical literature suggests that the magnitude of such spillovers is large for general innovation 
(e.g., Griliches 1992; Mansfield 1985; Levin et al. 1988; Jones and Williams 1998).  
Nonetheless, some studies (e.g., Nordhaus 2002; Goulder and Schneider 1999) suggest 
that induced innovation has only a modest effect in setting the appropriate tax on CO2. This 
reflects the fact that firms already have ongoing incentives to develop more fuel efficient 
vehicles, power plants, and so forth, and carbon pricing has a relatively moderate impact on 
enhancing these incentives. Moreover, extra R&D effort in the energy sector will probably 
crowd out socially valuable innovative effort elsewhere in the economy through the bidding up 
of research input prices, thereby limiting overall efficiency gains from induced innovation. Two 
caveats apply here: the models do not really capture incentives for transformative technologies 
(e.g., carbon capture and storage and plug-in electric vehicles) and they do not include climate 
change benefits from the adoption by other countries of U.S.-developed technologies.  
Rather than setting stiff carbon prices, however, most analysts recommend targeting 
technology spillovers through more direct measures aimed at stimulating research.22 
Unfortunately, the available literature provides limited guidance on just how much extra energy-
related R&D should be stimulated and which instrument—among R&D subsidies, technology 
prizes, and strengthened patent protection—should be used (e.g., Wright 1983). Some analysts 
argue that, even after the development of new technologies, further incentives are needed to 
encourage technology diffusion, such as vehicle fuel economy regulations or energy efficiency 
standards for household appliances. Such policies might be warranted in the presence of 
additional market failures (e.g., consumer undervaluation of energy efficiency improvements). 
Whether such additional market failures exist and their potential magnitude, however, remains an 
unsettled issue in the literature.  
C. Summary 
At a domestic level, designing a CO2 tax is fairly straightforward, especially if imposed 
upstream in the fossil fuel supply chain as a carbon-added tax. Incorporating at least some non-
CO2 GHGs into the tax system is quite feasible, as is providing incentives for downstream 
geological and biological CO2 sequestration. The main difficulties lie in deciding the tax level 
                                                 
22 In general, it is better to target each market failure (i.e., the emissions externality and the technology spillover 
externality) with two separate policy instruments, rather than just one instrument (Fischer and Newell 2008; Goulder 
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and how rapidly it should escalate over time, as well as ensuring the productive use of revenues, 
in the presence of pressure for spending to satisfy special interests.  
IV. CO2 Taxes at a Global Level 
We now turn to issues in the development of an international architecture based on CO2 
pricing. In particular, we discuss implementation issues and the relative ease or difficulty of 
reaching international agreements with tax- and quantity-based instruments. We focus on a 
multilateral “top-down” approach to climate policy agreements where countries attempt to reach 
agreement on the CO2 tax rates they will each impose or targets for emissions control. Many of 
the issues are not so pressing if international climate policy emerges unilaterally from the bottom 
up, with countries developing their own targets and policy instruments either to set an example, 
or to follow an example set by other countries. 
To be successful, any international climate agreement needs to meet a number of key 
criteria (Aldy and Stavins 2007a). These include cost-effectiveness, equity, broad participation, 
ease of reaching agreement on taxes or emissions targets, verification of member compliance 
with the agreement, and domestic institutional capability to implement the policy. We take each 
of these in turn. As we discuss, the first three criteria for a successful climate control agreement 
could, in principle, be met under either tax- or allowance-based approaches. And although it may 
be more difficult both to reach, and to implement, an international permit-trading system, 
concerns about emissions control effectiveness being compromised by other surreptitious policy 
adjustments pose greater challenges under the tax-based regime.23 
A. Cost-Effectiveness 
At any given time, cost-effectiveness requires that the marginal costs of abatement are 
roughly the same across different countries. In a dynamic sense, it also requires that marginal 
abatement costs are roughly equated, in present value terms, across current and future periods (or 
that they are equated with marginal emissions damages under a welfare-maximizing approach).  
The cost-effectiveness condition can be met if all countries impose the same tax rate on 
CO2—and the same tax on other GHGs and credits for sequestration—and the tax rate rises at the 
                                                 
23 As brought to our attention by Jon Strand, the potential for rent extraction by the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel is greater when facing a cap set by energy-importing countries than when facing 
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rate of interest over time (or with the growth rate in marginal emissions damages).24 Under an 
international cap-and-trade system, marginal abatement costs are equated across different regions 
at a point in time if the international regime fully integrates efficient domestic allowance-trading 
markets. Frictionless borrowing and banking provisions help to equate marginal abatement costs 
in the current period with those expected in future periods. Under either the tax or allowance 
system, promoting dynamic cost-effectiveness requires that policies are set in advance over a 
long time horizon. If policy commitment periods are short, there is the danger that policy 
stringency will significantly diverge across different commitment periods, causing marginal 
abatement costs to differ across time. Moreover, a stable, long-term policy framework will help 
firms make efficient decisions with regard to major R&D or technology investments with long-
run payoffs. Finally, a cost-effective agreement can promote (a) broader participation, by 
limiting the downside risks of noncompliance, and (b) deeper participation, by facilitating more 
aggressive policy goals in the future. 
B. Equity 
Usually, an equitable agreement among member countries means that more advanced, 
wealthier members bear a relatively greater cost burden than less developed, poorer nations. The 
burden of emissions abatement costs is likely to differ dramatically across regions under an 
internationally harmonized CO2 price. In fact, as suggested by Table 2, emerging and developing 
countries, especially China, would probably bear a disproportionately larger cost than the United 
States and Western Europe, given the higher CO2-to-GDP intensities in the former countries.  
                                                 
24 Ideally, one would like all agents to face the same unified emissions price; however, because of distortions in 
foreign exchange markets—such as tariffs on trade, licensing, official intervention, and so on—a single rate defined, 
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Table 2. Projected Emissions of CO2 from Fossil Fuels as a Proportion of Real GDP 
 Year 
Country 2002  2101  2020  2030  2040 
          
United States  0.55  0.51  0.47  0.45  0.43 
Japan 0.30  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.26 
Eastern Europe  0.85  0.77  0.69  0.63  0.58 
Western Europe  0.37  0.35  0.31  0.29  0.26 
Industrial (Annex 1) 
countries 
0.51 0.47 0.43  0.40  0.38 
China 3.11  2.48  2.69  2.72  2.72 
Other developing and 
emerging economies 
0.87 0.75 0.71  0.70  0.69 
OPEC economies  1.82  1.50  1.36  1.34  1.31 
Non-Annex 1 
economies 
1.29 1.12 1.14  1.12  1.08 
World 0.67  0.61  0.63  0.63  0.63 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2008), Table 4.5. 
Notes: The ratios refer to metric tons of CO2 per thousand 2000 US$ using market exchange rates. Annex I refers to 
the group of 40 industrial countries that were signatories to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to control GHG emissions. 
Non-Annex I countries refers to all other developing and industrializing nations. 
To preserve the cost-effectiveness criterion, equity concerns would ideally be addressed 
through inter-country side payments or other compensation rather than by allowing policy 
stringency, and hence marginal abatement costs, to differ across countries. Under a CO2 tax 
system, a portion of the revenues raised in wealthier nations might be redistributed to the 
relatively poor countries through some agreed upon formula that accounts for measures of per 
capita income, emissions intensities, and perhaps historical contributions to atmospheric GHG 
accumulations. An analog to direct side payments exists under the cap-and-trade approach, 
where wealthier countries take on more stringent emissions caps but can exceed these targets by 
purchasing emissions allowances from poorer countries with relatively lax targets.  
C. Broad Country Participation 
Obviously, the more countries participate, the more effective the agreement will be in 
reducing global emissions. Moreover, broad participation reduces the risk of emissions leakage 
resulting from the relocation of energy-intensive firms within the covered region to countries 
with no climate policy. The breadth of participation reflects important ex ante and ex post policy 
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The first, ex ante, dimension focuses on the number of countries joining the climate 
policy coalition. Presumably, these countries value the benefits of participation—and of doing 
something about climate change—more than their burden of costs, whereas those that do not 
initially participate hold the opposite valuation. Enticing new countries into the agreement over 
time may again require direct side payments or emissions targets that are initially less onerous. 
More generally, some countries may remain outside of the formal emissions mitigation 
agreement but be included in a looser, informal group with more ad hoc incentives for emissions 
mitigation. For example, some of the revenues from an international CO2 tax (or from allowance 
auctions) could finance technology transfer to developing countries.   
The second, ex post, dimension is the possibility that individual countries in the 
agreement will not comply with their obligations or that they may even pull out of the agreement 
altogether. To deter this may require penalties for noncompliance. For example, countries make 
an up-front deposit into a fund during the first phase of the policy period (perhaps out of 
revenues from CO2 taxes or allowance auctions) and the fund returns the proceeds, with interest, 
at the end of the policy period, but only to those countries remaining in the agreement. Others 
have suggested the use of trade sanctions to penalize noncomplying and nonparticipating 
countries (Nordhaus 1998; Aldy et al. 2001). 
D. Reaching Agreement on Taxes or Targets 
In a Kyoto-like system, countries have to agree on a set of national emissions targets. 
Initially, these targets can be set relative to actual emissions in a recent reference year; the Kyoto 
Protocol stipulates 1990 as its reference year. This focus on targets as a function of a historic 
reference year presents problems for comparing effort and burdens across countries that may 
experience very different baseline (no new policy) emissions growth rates. Thus, reducing 
emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, as the Kyoto Protocol would 
have required the United States to do had it not withdrawn from the treaty, would have been 
quite costly, as emissions have grown rapidly since 1990. Similar targets for the United Kingdom 
and Germany are much less onerous because their emissions declined in the 1990s with the 
closure of uneconomic coal mines and manufacturing facilities.  
Under a tax-based regime, only one variable must be negotiated—the tax rate on CO2 that 
countries should impose (along with a rule for tightening it over time). This precludes countries 
from haggling over country-level targets endemic to a Kyoto-style approach. Of course, if some 
countries decide not to participate in a harmonized CO2 tax regime, then they are implicitly 
imposing a different (zero) tax on their sources of GHG emissions. Explicit transfers (as Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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discussed above) or issue linkage—such as the provision of benefits through trade or 
development policy agendas—may be necessary to discourage developing countries from 
advocating for differential tax rates. 
E. Institutional Capability in Developing and Industrializing Nations 
Variability in baseline emissions also reflects substantial uncertainty in forecasting 
emissions. Many developing countries lack the capacity to estimate future emissions to assess the 
implicit stringency of quantitative targets. This motivates the primary developing country 
objection that emissions caps could constrain economic growth. Even if developing countries 
could take on quantitative caps, implementing them through a domestic cap-and-trade system 
may not be feasible. Few developing countries have sufficiently strong environmental ministries 
to design a cap-and-trade regime. Moreover, weak and less than fully independent judicial 
institutions raise questions about the enforcement of allowances as property rights. The prospect 
of free allowance allocations in nations with limited or mixed experiences with privatization also 
suggests that the tax alternative is superior. From an institutional perspective, much more 
powerful finance ministries could administer a carbon tax. In some countries, the finance 
ministry could simply integrate the carbon tax with existing taxes on fossil fuel purchasers. This 
approach would also take advantage of existing monitoring of energy production, imports, 
exports, and consumption. Some finance ministries in developing countries may advocate for 
CO2 taxes as a new source of badly need revenue (Cooper 2007). 
Employing a policy (a CO2 tax) instead of a goal (a quantitative emissions target) may 
also be a more appropriate way to move forward with country-level commitments. National 
governments should commit to what they can directly control. Firms and individuals undertake 
activities that emit GHGs; governments are responsible for a small share of emissions. Focusing 
on policy actions may provide for a more credible negotiation than emissions goals that some 
countries may not know how to attain. 
F. Verification 
The main drawback of the tax-based approach at the international level is that it could be 
undermined by “fiscal cushioning:” the reduction of other taxes borne by sources of GHGs to 
partly offset the burden of a CO2 tax (Wiener 1999). In some cases, offsetting reductions in other Resources for the Future  Aldy, Ley, and Parry 
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energy taxes are transparent (e.g., a reduction in a gasoline tax); in other cases, they are not (e.g., 
complex tax loopholes for expensing of capital or technology investments).25 The same problem 
does not apply under emissions allowance systems because countries still must meet their 
national emissions quotas, regardless or whether they introduce compensatory measures for 
energy.  
A possible response to the risk of fiscal cushioning is to develop a broader measure of a 
country’s effective CO2 tax, accounting for preexisting energy taxes or subsidies. For example, 
the 40-cent-per-gallon gasoline tax in the United States (on average across the states) is 
equivalent to a $45 tax per ton on CO2 from the automotive sector, or about $9 per ton of CO2 for 
nationwide emissions. Similarly, estimated government revenues forgone from the favorable tax 
treatment of energy industries could be expressed per ton of CO2. In principle, all countries 
might be pressured or required to increase this broader CO2 tax at the same rate over time. 
Therefore, any reductions in other energy taxes would require an offset through a higher formal 
tax on CO2. 
This approach, however, raises three problems. First, it is not always easy to measure the 
magnitude of complex and opaque systems of energy tax preferences, although international 
inspection of taxing agencies and the accounts of energy companies would help. Second, broader 
energy taxes might offset externalities. For example, Parry and Small (2005) estimate that 
gasoline taxes in the United States fall well below (second-best) levels that might be warranted 
by traffic congestion, accident, and local pollution externalities. Effectively, this means that 
gasoline is actually subsidized, not taxed. Third, a wide variety of nontax regulations further 
penalize, or favor, energy sectors, such as price regulation in the power sector and standards for 
emissions rates and fuel economy on automobiles. In principle, the tax equivalent of these other 
regulations needs to be quantified, along with the externalities, and then converted into their CO2 
tax or subsidy equivalents to obtain an unbiased measure of overall CO2 taxes. These procedures 
would be quite detailed and controversial. 
These considerations suggest the need for two kinds of regular, systematic country 
reviews. The first type of review would assess whether governments undertake explicit (by 
changing other tax laws) or implicit (by changing tax subsidies and other regulations) fiscal 
                                                 
25 Sweden reduced some of its energy taxes on the most energy-intensive industries when it implemented its carbon 
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cushioning for various sources subject to the CO2 tax policy. The second type of review would 
evaluate progress on mitigating emissions, compare efforts across countries, and assess the 
adequacy of the aggregate effort in combating climate change. These evaluations should be 
conducted by an independent, international institution, akin to the International Monetary Fund’s 
Article IV consultations and the OECD’s annual review of member countries’ economic policies 
(Aldy and Stavins 2007b). Although the reviews may not be sufficient on their own to deter 
fiscal cushioning, the spotlight on such efforts could draw condemnation from other countries. 
The pressure from other countries could establish a norm against fiscal cushioning and promote 
broad, if occasionally incomplete, participation.    
V. Concluding Remarks 
The success of domestic and international efforts to slow global climate change will 
depend on how policies meet key criteria, such as keeping down overall policy costs, satisfying 
distributional objectives, addressing economic variability and disruptions, providing incentives 
for clean technology development, and facilitating policy coordination and verification among 
countries. In principle, revenue-neutral CO2 taxes appear to have a number of advantages over 
cap-and-trade systems, but the devil lies in the details of the implementation. At the domestic 
level, an appropriately designed cap-and-trade system—with allowance auctions and smart 
revenue recycling as well as mechanisms to contain costs, such as a safety valve or banking and 
borrowing—could mimic many of the benefits of a CO2 tax. Even so, at the international level, a 
CO2 tax might be more effective at promoting broad country participation, especially among 
developing countries with limited institutions for implementing a new permit-trading system.  
Cap-and-trade systems that emerge in practice may also contain serious design flaws. For 
example, although the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme will transition to nearly full 
allowance auctions, it is not yet clear whether all European Union governments will use the 
revenues productively. And although the policy now permits full allowance banking, it still 
prohibits allowance borrowing across commitment periods; in the near term, this leaves it 
exposed to the risks of large disruptions, for example, from fuel price shocks. If such a disruption 
occurs, that could undermine popular support for future, progressive tightening of the emissions 
cap and for the introduction of similar schemes in other countries. Until allowance systems are 
well designed and have proven to stand the test of time, the revenue-neutral CO2 tax remains an 
attractive alternative, and possibly the more likely policy to facilitate the durable and substantial 
agreement needed to seriously slow global warming over the coming decades.  
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